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11 Introduction
This paper explores the implications of worker self-conﬁdence in the classic
labor market signaling model by Spence (1973). Firms are perfectly compet-
itive and cannot observe workers’ productive abilities, which may be either
high or low. Unbiased workers know their marginal cost of acquiring edu-
cation. Overconﬁdent (underconﬁdent) workers believe that their marginal
cost of acquiring education is low (high) when, in fact, it is high (low). Firms
cannot observe workers’ beliefs but know the fraction of high-ability, over-
conﬁdent, and underconﬁdent workers in the labor market.
I start by showing that workers’ biased self-evaluations can lead to wage
compression. Wage compression, i.e., the fact that there are lower wage
diﬀerences across workers than diﬀerences in productivity, is a key feature
of many labor markets and has important consequences for labor market
performance. While a compressed wage structure is generally believed to
reduce labor market eﬃciency and welfare, it has also been used to explain
why ﬁrm sponsored training of employees can arise.1
My ﬁrst result shows that biased beliefs compress wages in the sense that
the wage spread with biased workers is smaller than the wage spread with
rational workers. In a separating equilibrium, overconﬁdent low-ability work-
ers and unbiased high-ability workers choose a high education level whereas
underconﬁdent high-ability workers and unbiased low-ability workers choose
a low education level. The optimal response of ﬁrms to the fact that over-
conﬁdence raises the proportion of low-ability workers in the high education
group whereas underconﬁdence raises the proportion of high-ability workers
in the low education group is to lower the wage of the high education group
and raise the wage of the low education group.
I also ﬁnd that the presence of biased workers in the labor market com-
presses the wages of unbiased workers in the sense that the wage spread
across unbiased workers is less than the productivity spread. In contrast, the
model predicts that the wage spread across biased workers is greater than
the productivity spread.
Next, I study the impact of gender diﬀerences in self-conﬁdence on the
gender pay gap, i.e., the fact that men earn, on average, more than women.
1The economics literature has proposed several explanations for wage compression,
ranging from labor market institutions, to incentives not to sabotage colleagues competing
in a tournament, to fairness considerations in wage-setting decisions by ﬁrms. I review the
relevant literature in Section 3.
2I show that if education raises productivity, males are overconﬁdent, and
females underconﬁdent, then there is a gender pay gap.2 The intuition behind
this result is as follows. Before making any educational investments, men
and women are equally productive. However, if men are overconﬁdent and
women underconﬁdent, the proportion of men among the male population
who acquire a high education level will be higher than the proportion of
women among the female population who acquire a high education level. If
education raises productivity, then men will be, on average, more productive
than women. This generates the gender pay gap.
Finally, I show that if the fraction of overconﬁdent workers is not too
high and workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity and cost
of education, then biased beliefs can improve welfare. When all workers are
unbiased, Spence’s (1973) model shows that if the two groups of workers are
suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity and cost of education, then there
exist separating equilibria with overinvestment in education by the more
productive group. In this case private information about productive ability
reduces welfare. However, Spence (2002) shows that it is possible to improve
market eﬃciency with an optimal tax-subsidy schedule that consists of a
rising tax on education which reduces the level of education of high-ability
workers combined with a lump-sum transfer to low-ability workers so that
net tax revenues are zero.
The reasons why workers’ biased beliefs raise welfare are similar to those
why a tax-subsidy schedule raises welfare. Overconﬁdence is like a “tax” on
the education of unbiased high-ability workers because it lowers their wage
and their education. When the fraction of overconﬁdent workers is not too
high, the education level of unbiased high-ability workers will be close to the
optimal. Underconﬁdence is like a “subsidy” for unbiased low-ability workers
because it raises their wage for a given education level. This result is consis-
tent with the theory of the second best. According to this theory, introducing
a new distortion–workers’ biased beliefs–in an environment where another
distortion is already present–private information about skill–, may increase
welfare.
Of course, welfare does not always rise when workers have biased beliefs
and are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity and cost of education.
If the fraction of overconﬁdent workers is too high, unbiased high-ability
workers are “overtaxed” and end up with an education level far from the
2Section 4 contains a brief discussion of the large literature on the gender pay gap.
3optimal. In this case there is a transfer of utility from unbiased high-ability
to unbiased low-ability workers.
One policy implication of the welfare analysis is that improving workers’
self-evaluations will reduce welfare when the fraction of overconﬁdent workers
is not too high and workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity
and cost of education. In contrast, if either (i) workers are suﬃciently diﬀer-
ent or (ii) a signiﬁcant fraction of workers is overconﬁdent and workers are
suﬃciently similar, then improving self-evaluations increases welfare.
The assumption that some workers are overconﬁdent and others under-
conﬁdent is supported by robust empirical evidence on patterns of over- and
underestimation in self-evaluation of skills. Overconﬁdence is a staple ﬁnd-
ing in psychology and has been shown to be present in individuals’ self-
assessments of performance in their jobs. According to Myers (1996), a
textbook in social psychology, “(...) on nearly any dimension that is both
subjective and socially desirable, most people see themselves as better than
average.”3
Kruger and Dunning (1999) ﬁnd that it is the poorest performers who
hold the least accurate evaluations of their skills and performances, grossly
overestimating how well their performances stack up against those of their
peers. They observe that students performing in the bottom 25% among
their peers on tests of grammar, logical reasoning, and humor tend to think
that they are performing above the 60% percentile. They also ﬁnd that top
performers consistently underestimate how superior their performances are
relative to their peers. In Kruger and Dunning (1999) studies, the top 25%
tended to think that their skills lay in the 70-75% percentile, although their
performances fell roughly in the 87% percentile.4
This paper is an additional contribution to the growing literature on the
impact of behavioral biases on markets and organizations. DellaVigna and
Malmendier (2004) and Gabaix and Laibson (2006) study market interac-
3Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988) cite a survey of General Electric Company employ-
ees according to which 81 percent of a sample of white-collar clerical and technical workers
rated their own performance as falling within the top 20 percent of their peers in similar
jobs. Myers (1996) cites a study according to which, in Australia, 86 percent of people
rate their job performance as above average.
4These patterns have been replicated among undergraduates completing a classroom
exam (Dunning et al., 2003), medical students assessing their interviewing skills (Hodges,
Regehr, and Martin, 2001), clerks evaluating their performance (Edwards et al., 2003), and
medical laboratory technicians evaluating their on-the-job expertise (Haun et al., 2000).
4tions between sophisticated ﬁrms and biased consumers. They ﬁnd that in
competitive markets, biased consumers may be indirectly exploited by so-
phisticated consumers.
Sandroni and Squintani (2007) investigate the policy implications of over-
conﬁdence in insurance markets. They ﬁnd that compulsory insurance fails
to make all agents better oﬀ because it is detrimental to low-risk agents.
Thus, behavioral biases may weaken asymmetric information rationales for
government intervention in insurance markets.
My paper is closely related to literature on the impact of overconﬁdence
on labor market choices. Squintani (1999) studies overconﬁdence and on-the-
job signaling. He ﬁnds that overconﬁdent workers choose tasks that are too
onerous, fail them, and, dejected by such a failure, settle down for a position
inferior to their potential. Hvide (2002) shows that worker overconﬁdence
about productivity outside the ﬁrm improves worker welfare. Santos-Pinto
(2008, 2010) shows how ﬁrms can design optimal contracts to take advantage
of worker overconﬁdence about productivity inside the ﬁrm.
Dubra (2004) and Falk, Huﬀman, and Sunde (2006) study the impact of
self-conﬁdence on job search. Dubra (2004) ﬁnds that if searchers are not pa-
tient, a slightly overconﬁdent one may fare better than unbiased ones because
he will search longer. Falk et al. (2006) show that unemployment duration
erodes self-conﬁdence and the willingness to continue search. This implies
that falling self-conﬁdence can be a complementary mechanism leading to
negative duration dependence.
Fang and Moscarini (2005) study the implication of worker overconﬁ-
dence on the ﬁrm’s optimal wage-setting policies using the principal-agent
approach. Wage contracts provide incentives and aﬀect workers’ conﬁdence
in their own skills by revealing private information of the ﬁrm about work-
ers’ skills. They ﬁnd, using numerical examples, that overconﬁdence is a
necessary condition for a ﬁrm to choose a non-diﬀerentiation wage policy
(the most extreme form of wage compression). This happens because, when
ability and eﬀort are complements, a non-diﬀerentiation wage policy pre-
serves worker overconﬁdence which in turn induces higher eﬀort, oﬀsetting
the moral hazard ineﬃciency.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets-up the model. Section
3 shows that biased beliefs lower the wage spread and compress the wages of
unbiased workers. Section 4 shows that gender diﬀerences in self-conﬁdence
can contribute to the gender pay gap. Section 5 analyzes the impact of
biased beliefs on welfare. Section 6 explains how the paper contributes to
5the existing literature on labor market signaling and discusses extensions of
the model. Section 7 concludes. Proofs of all results are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
For each worker there are two possible productive abilities: low, θL, and high,
θH, with 0 < θL < θH. Nature determines a worker’s productive ability and
beliefs about marginal cost of acquiring education. The worker chooses a
level of education, e ≥ 0, based on her beliefs. Two ﬁrms, 1 and 2, observe
the worker’s education and then simultaneously make wage oﬀers w1 and w2,
with wi ≥ 0, i = 1,2. The worker accepts the highest of the two wage oﬀers,
ﬂipping a coin in case of a tie.
The payoﬀ of a ﬁrm that employs a worker with ability θ and education
e is π(w,e,θ) = y(e,θ) −w, where y(e,θ) is the worker’s output. The payoﬀ
of a ﬁrm that does not employ a worker is zero. High-ability workers are
more productive: yθ(e,θ) > 0. Education does not reduce productivity, i.e.,
ye(e,θ) ≥ 0 where ye(e,θ) is the marginal productivity of education for a
worker of ability θ at education e. The marginal productivity of education is
non-increasing with education: yee(e,θ) ≤ 0. The marginal productivity of
education is non-decreasing with ability: yeθ(e,θ) ≥ 0.
There are four types of workers in the labor market. Unbiased high-ability
workers have marginal cost of acquiring education ce(e,θH) and know it. Un-
biased low-ability workers have marginal cost of acquiring education ce(e,θL)
and know it. Overconﬁdent low-ability workers believe their marginal cost
of acquiring education is ce(e,θH) when in fact it is ce(e,θL). Underconﬁ-
dent high-ability workers believe their marginal cost of acquiring education
is ce(e,θL) when in fact it is ce(e,θH). Let λ = Pr(θ = θH) ∈ (0,1) be
the fraction of high-ability workers, ν ∈ [0,λ] be the fraction of underconﬁ-
dent high-ability workers, and κ ∈ [0,1 − λ] be the fraction of overconﬁdent
low-ability workers. Firms cannot observe a worker’s productive ability and
beliefs, but know λ, κ and ν.
The utility of an employed worker is u(w,e,θ) = w − c(e,θ), where w is
the wage oﬀer made by a ﬁrm and c(e,θ) is the cost to a worker with ability θ
to obtaining education e. The utility of an unemployed worker is normalized
to zero. The cost of no education is zero: c(0,θ) = 0. The cost of education
increases with education: ce(e,θ) > 0, where ce(e,θ) is the marginal cost of
education for a worker of ability θ at education e. The cost of education
6decreases with ability: cθ(e,θ) < 0. The marginal cost of education increases
with education: cee(e,θ) > 0. The marginal cost of education decreases with
ability: ceθ(e,θ) < 0. This assumption is critical since it means that low-
ability workers ﬁnd signaling more costly than high-ability workers, i.e., for
every e, ce(e,θL) > ce(e,θH). The assumption is also known as the Spence-
Mirrlees single-crossing condition since it implies that the indiﬀerence curves
of low- and high-ability workers only cross once.
In a separating equilibrium, education choices are determined by work-
ers’ beliefs about their marginal cost of acquiring education: underconﬁdent
high-ability workers and unbiased low-ability workers choose a low educa-
tion level, eLU, whereas overconﬁdent low-ability workers and unbiased high-
ability workers choose a high education level, eHO, with eHO ∈ [ˆ eB,   eB], and
eHO > eLU. Firms cannot distinguish between underconﬁdent high-ability
workers and unbiased low-ability workers because, at the time wage oﬀers
are made, both types of workers have the same education level: eLU. Simi-
larly, ﬁrms cannot distinguish between overconﬁdent low-ability workers and
unbiased high-ability workers because both types of workers display the same
education level eHO. However, ﬁrms know λ, κ and ν.
Among all workers who choose an education level eLU ﬁrms know that
fraction α = ν
1−λ−κ+ν has high ability and fraction 1 − α = 1−λ−κ
1−λ−κ+ν has low
ability. Among all workers who choose an education level eHO ﬁrms know
that fraction β = κ
λ+κ−ν has low ability and fraction 1− β = λ−ν
λ+κ−ν has high
ability. Hence, the ﬁrms’ posterior belief that a worker has high ability after
observing education level e is
 (θH|e) =
￿
α, for e < eHO
1 − β, for e ≥ eHO .
The ﬁrms’ strategy is then
w(e) =
￿
(1 − α)y(e,θL) + αy(e,θH), for e < eHO
βy(e,θL) + (1 − β)y(e,θH), for e ≥ eHO . (1)
The ﬁrms’ strategy is derived from the assumption that ﬁrms make zero
proﬁts in equilibrium and that ﬁrms know λ, κ and ν. Competition between
ﬁrms implies that the wage oﬀered to each group of workers (those who
choose eLU and those who choose eHO) must be a weighted average of the
productivities of each type of worker in the group.
In a separating equilibrium the wage of overconﬁdent low-ability workers
and unbiased high-ability workers is higher than the wage of underconﬁdent
7high-ability workers and unbiased low-ability workers. It follows from (1)
and eLU < eHO that this condition is satisﬁed if α + β ≤ 1, or, using the
deﬁnitions of α and β,
(1 − λ)ν + λκ ≤ (1 − λ)λ. (2)
Condition (2) says that if the fractions of overconﬁdent and underconﬁ-
dent workers are suﬃciently small, education can serve as a signal of produc-
tive ability. When the fraction of biased workers is too high, condition (2) is
violated and separating equilibria may no longer exist.5 I assume from now
on that condition (2) is satisﬁed.
In a separating equilibrium underconﬁdent high-ability workers and un-
biased low-ability workers do not envy overconﬁdent low-ability workers and
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and overconﬁdent low-ability workers and unbiased high-ability workers do
not envy underconﬁdent high-ability workers and unbiased low-ability work-
ers, that is
βy(e







Let e∗(σ,β) be the solution to maxe [βy(e,θL) + (1 − β)y(e,θH) − c(e,θH)],
where σ = (θL,θH). Let the wage and utility associated with e∗(σ,β) be
w∗(σ,β) = βy(e∗(σ,β),θL)+(1−β)y(e∗(σ,β),θH) and u∗(σ,β) = w∗(σ,β)−
c(e∗(σ,β),θH)), respectively. Additionally, let e∗(σ,α) be the solution to
maxe [(1 − α)y(e,θL) + αy(e,θH) − c(e,θL)]. Finally, let the wage and utility
associated with e∗(σ,α) be w∗(σ,α) = (1−α)y(e∗(σ,α),θL)+αy(e∗(σ,α),θH)
and u∗(σ,α) = w∗(σ,α) − c(e∗(σ,α),θL)).
There are two qualitatively diﬀerent kinds of separating equilibria. If
workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity and cost of acquiring
5There are always pooling equilibria where all types of workers choose the same educa-
tion level e. The ﬁrms’ posterior belief about a worker’s productive ability after observing
e must be the prior belief,  (θH|e) = λ, which in turn implies that the equilibrium wage
is w = λy(e,θH) + (1 − λ)y(e,θL).
8education and the fraction of biased workers is not too high, separation re-
quires “overeducation” by the overconﬁdent low-ability workers and unbiased
high-ability workers. This happens when underconﬁdent high-ability workers
and unbiased low-ability workers prefer the wage w∗(σ,β) and the education







When inequality (5) is satisﬁed, overconﬁdent low-ability workers and unbi-
ased high-ability workers must choose an education level greater than e∗(σ,β)
to distinguish themselves from underconﬁdent high-ability workers and un-
biased low-ability workers, i.e., eHO ∈ [ˆ eHO,   eHO], with ˆ eHO > e∗(σ,β).6
If workers are suﬃciently diﬀerent in terms of productivity and cost of
education or if the fraction of biased workers is suﬃciently high, separation
does not require “overeducation” by the overconﬁdent low-ability workers
and unbiased high-ability workers. In this case it is too expensive for un-
derconﬁdent high-ability workers and unbiased low-ability workers to ac-
quire education e∗(σ,β), even if doing so would make ﬁrms believe that
they are overconﬁdent low-ability workers or unbiased high-ability work-
ers and cause them to pay the wage w∗(σ,β), thus violating inequality (5):
w∗(σ,α) − c(e∗(σ,α),θL) > w∗(σ,β) − c(e∗(σ,β),θL).
3 Wage Compression
A key feature of many labor markets is the presence of wage compression
across skills (see Garibaldi, 2006, pp. 21). Wage compression refers to a
tendency of wages to be equalized across the skill distribution.
Campbell and Kamlani (1997) conducted a survey of 184 US ﬁrms and
found that pay diﬀerentials represented about one half of the productivity
diﬀerential between any two workers identical in all respects but productiv-
ity. Frank (1984a) examined wages and productivities of sales workers and
university professors, and found that the more productive workers were paid
6Inequality (5) is satisﬁed if workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity
and cost of acquiring education and the fraction of biased workers is not too high. Indeed,
supposing y(e,θ) = θe and c(e,θ) = e2/2θ, then e∗(σ,α) = θL(θL + αρ), e∗(σ,β) =
θH(θH − βρ), where ρ = θH − θL, and (5) becomes θH
θL < 2 −
θL(θL+αρ)2
θH(θH−βρ)2.
9less than their marginal product, while the least productive were paid more
than their marginal product.
Mourre (2005) provides evidence that there is a compressed wage dis-
tribution in Europe. Wage compression mainly occurs in continental and
southern countries, whilst no compression is detected in Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries and mixed evidence is found in Northern European countries. She also
ﬁnds that the compression of wages is not uniform across wage levels: there
is more wage compression at the lower end of the earnings distribution.
Wage compression has important consequences for labor market out-
comes. Lindquist (2005) shows that even low degrees of wage compres-
sion lead to large welfare losses from costly unemployment among low-skilled
workers. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) demonstrate that wage compression
may encourage employers to oﬀer and pay for general training. By making
the ﬁrm a residual claimant of productivity increases, a compressed wage
structure increases the willingness of ﬁrms to ﬁnance training of their em-
ployees.
Economic theory oﬀers two main explanations for wage compression. The
ﬁrst one identiﬁes exogenous labor market frictions and institutions like mo-
bility costs, trade-unions, eﬃciency wages, wage ﬂoors, or any institution
which contributes to raise the reservation wage (e.g., generous unemploy-
ment beneﬁts), as sources of wage compression. Freeman (1982) shows that
unionized ﬁrms appear to have less wage dispersion than non—unionized ones.
The second type of explanations identiﬁes endogenous causes for wage
compression. Frank (1984b) shows that if workers value status, then those
who put a highest value on prestige will be willing to work for a wage that
is lower than their marginal product in return for having lower-level workers
around who in return are paid more than their marginal product. In contrast,
Lazear (1989) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) argue that wage inequalities
may give rise to rent-seeking behavior within ﬁrms when workers change their
behavior with the aim of ensuring wage increases. Wage compression reduces
uncooperative behavior and may be eﬃcient. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) posit
that large wage diﬀerentials between groups may be perceived as unfair and
lead to reduced eﬀort.
In this section I start by showing that biased beliefs compress wages in
the sense that the wage spread with biased workers is smaller than the wage
spread with rational workers. After that I show that biased beliefs compress
the wages of unbiased workers, i.e., wage diﬀerences across unbiased workers
are smaller than diﬀerences in productivity.
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education workers and these in turn depend on their education investments,
I must start by characterizing the impact of biased beliefs on education in-
vestments and wages. Proposition 1 characterizes the wage and education
levels of low education workers and applies to any separating equilibrium.
Proposition 1: In a separating equilibrium: (i) the education level of
underconﬁdent high-ability workers and unbiased low-ability workers is at
least the ﬁrst-best education level of low-ability workers—eLU = e∗(σ,α) ≥
e∗(θL)—, (ii) the wage paid to underconﬁdent high-ability workers and un-
biased low-ability workers is greater than the ﬁrst-best wage of low-ability
workers—w(eLU) = w∗(σ,α) > w∗(θL)—, and (iii) the utility of unbiased low-
ability workers is greater than the ﬁrst-best utility of low-ability workers—
u(w(eLU),eLU,θL) = u∗(σ,α) > u∗(θL).
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. Underconﬁdent high-
ability workers think (mistakenly) they have a high marginal cost of acquiring
education and, like unbiased low-ability workers, choose a low education level.
Firms observe this low education level but since they are unable to distinguish
each type of worker, they pay a wage that is equal to the average product of
underconﬁdent high-ability workers and unbiased low-ability workers. This
implies that, for a given education level, the marginal beneﬁt of education is
higher for underconﬁdent high-ability workers and unbiased low-ability work-
ers than it would be for low-ability workers if everyone were rational. Since
the perceived marginal cost of education is the same, the education level of
underconﬁdent high-ability workers and unbiased low-ability workers is at
least the ﬁrst-best education level of low-ability workers. Thus, underconﬁ-
dent high-ability workers and unbiased low-ability workers are paid a higher
wage than the ﬁrst-best wage of low-ability workers since they have a higher
average product and at least the same education. Finally, the utility of un-
biased low-ability workers is higher than the ﬁrst-best utility of low-ability
workers because the positive direct eﬀect of underconﬁdence on the wage is
larger than the negative eﬀect of shifting the education level away from the
optimal one.
Proposition 2 characterizes the wage and education levels of high educa-
tion workers when the model has a unique separating equilibrium.
Proposition 2: If workers are suﬃciently diﬀerent in terms of productivity
and cost of acquiring education or the fraction of biased workers is suﬃciently
high—inequality (5) is violated—, then: (i) the education level of overconﬁdent
11low-ability workers and unbiased high-ability workers is at most the ﬁrst-
best education level of high-ability workers—eHO = e∗(σ,β) ≤ e∗(θH)—, (ii)
the wage paid to overconﬁdent low-ability workers and unbiased high-ability
workers is less than the ﬁrst-best wage of high-ability workers—w(eHO) =
w∗(σ,β) < w∗(θH)—, and (iii) the utility of unbiased high-ability workers is
smaller than the ﬁrst-best utility of high-ability workers—u(w(eHO),eHO,θH) =
u∗(σ,β) < u∗(θH).
When workers are suﬃciently diﬀerent in terms of productivity and cost
of education or the fraction of biased workers is suﬃciently high, there is
a unique separating equilibrium. Overconﬁdent low-ability workers think
(mistakenly) they have a low marginal cost of acquiring education and, like
unbiased high-ability workers, choose a high education level. Firms observe
this high education level but since they are unable to distinguish each type of
worker, they pay a wage that is equal to the average product of overconﬁdent
low-ability workers and unbiased high-ability workers. This implies that,
for a given education level, the marginal beneﬁt of education is lower for
overconﬁdent low-ability workers and unbiased high-ability workers than for
high-ability workers if everyone were rational. Since the perceived marginal
cost of education is the same, overconﬁdent low-ability workers and unbiased
high-ability workers will, at most, acquire the ﬁrst-best education level of
high-ability workers. Thus, overconﬁdent low-ability workers and unbiased
high-ability workers are paid a lower wage than the ﬁrst-best wage of high-
ability workers since they have a lower average product and at most the
same education. Finally, the utility of unbiased high-ability workers is lower
than the ﬁrst-best utility of high-ability workers because overconﬁdence has
a negative direct eﬀect on the wage and shifts the education level away from
the optimal one.
I will now characterize the set of equilibria wage and education levels
of high education workers when the model has a continuum of separating
equilibria.
Proposition 3: If workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity
and cost of acquiring education and the fraction of biased workers is suf-
ﬁciently small—inequality (5) is satisﬁed—, then: (i) the education level of
overconﬁdent low-ability workers and unbiased high-ability workers belongs
to [ˆ eHO,  eHO], with ˆ eHO < ˆ eH and   eHO <   eH, and (ii) the wage paid to
overconﬁdent low-ability workers and unbiased high-ability workers belongs
to [ˆ wHO,   wHO], with ˆ wHO < ˆ wH and   wHO <   wH.
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ucation and everyone is rational there is a continuum of separating equilibria
where high-ability workers overinvest in education to distinguish themselves
from low-ability workers.7 In this case eH ∈ [ˆ eH,   eH] with ˆ eH > e∗(θH). These
various separating equilibria can be Pareto ranked. In all of them a high-
ability worker’s utility is y(eH,θH) − c(eH,θH), a low-ability worker’s utility
is u∗(θL), and ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts. However, a high-ability worker does
strictly better in equilibria where she gets a lower level of education (and a
lower wage) since this brings her utility closer to the complete information
utility u∗(θH). Thus, the separating equilibrium in which the high-ability
worker gets education level ˆ eH Pareto dominates all others and is called the
least cost separating equilibrium. The separating equilibrium in which the
high-ability worker gets education level   eH is called the most cost separating
equilibrium.
Proposition 3 shows that if inequality (5) is satisﬁed, then the educa-
tion and wage of overconﬁdent low-ability workers and unbiased high-ability
workers in the least (most) cost separating equilibrium with biased workers
is smaller than the education and wage, respectively, of high-ability workers
in the least (most) cost separating equilibrium with rational workers. Thus,
the set of equilibria education-wage levels of high-ability workers is higher
than (in the strong set order sense) the set of equilibria education-wage levels
of overconﬁdent low-ability workers and unbiased high-ability workers.8
The intuition behind the result is as follows. In the least cost separating
equilibrium with rational workers, low-ability workers are indiﬀerent between
getting their education-wage contract and that of high-ability workers, i.e.,
u∗(θL) = u(ˆ eH,θL). Similarly, in the least cost separating equilibrium with
biased workers, underconﬁdent high-ability workers and unbiased low-ability
workers are indiﬀerent between getting their education-wage contract and
that of overconﬁdent low-ability workers and unbiased high-ability workers,
i.e., u∗(σ,α) = u(ˆ eHO,θL).
We know from Proposition 1 part (iii) that the utility of underconﬁdent
high-ability workers and unbiased low-ability workers is higher than the ﬁrst-
7In this case inequality (5) is satisﬁed when α = β = 0, that is, w∗(θL)−c(e∗(θL),θL) <
w∗(θH) − c(e∗(θH,θL).
8A set M ⊆ R is as high as another set N ⊆ R (in the strong set order), written
M ￿S N, if for every x ∈ M and y ∈ N, y ≥ x implies both x ∈ M ∩ N and y ∈ M ∩ N.
A set M is higher than N, written M ≻S N if M is as high as N but N is not as high as
M.
13best utility of a low-ability worker, i.e., u∗(σ,α) > u∗(θL). This implies that,
in the least-cost separating equilibrium with biased workers, the utility of
underconﬁdent high-ability workers and unbiased low-ability workers of the
education-wage contract (ˆ eHO, ˆ wHO) is higher than the utility of (ˆ eH, ˆ wH),
i.e., u(ˆ eHO,θL) > u(ˆ eH,θL). But this can only be true if ˆ eHO is lower than
ˆ eH, i.e., overconﬁdent low-ability workers and unbiased high-ability workers
choose a lower education level than high-ability workers would if everyone
were rational.
The wage of overconﬁdent low-ability workers and unbiased high-ability
workers in the least cost separating equilibrium with biased workers is smaller
than the wage of high-ability workers in the least cost separating equilibrium
with rational workers because the education and productive ability of over-
conﬁdent low-ability workers and unbiased high-ability workers are smaller
than those of high-ability workers.
We are now ready to summarize the impact of workers’ biased beliefs on
the wage spread.
Corollary 1:
(i) If workers are suﬃciently diﬀerent in terms of productivity and cost of
education—inequality (5) is violated when α = β = 0—, then the equilibrium
wage spread with biased workers is smaller than that with rational workers,
i.e., △w∗(α,β) < △w∗;
(ii) If workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity and cost of
education and the fraction of biased workers is not too high—inequality (5) is
satisﬁed—, then the wage spread in the least (most) cost separating equilibrium
with biased workers is smaller than the wage spread in the least (most) cost
separating equilibrium with rational workers, i.e., △ˆ wB < △ˆ wR (△   wB <
△  wR).
The intuition behind Corollary 1 is as follows. The presence of under-
conﬁdent high-ability workers in the low-education group implies that the
average product of a worker in that group is higher than the product of a
low-ability worker. So, for the same education level, ﬁrms must pay a higher
wage to workers in the low-education group than they would to low-ability
workers if everyone were rational. This implies that the marginal beneﬁt of
education is higher for underconﬁdent high-ability workers and unbiased low-
ability workers than for low-ability workers if everyone were rational. Given
that the perceived marginal cost of education is the same, underconﬁdent
high-ability workers and unbiased low-ability workers will acquire at least
14the ﬁrst-best education level of low-ability workers. Since underconﬁdent
high-ability workers and unbiased low-ability workers have a higher aver-
age product and have acquired at least the education level that low-ability
workers would acquire if everyone were rational, they must be paid a higher
wage.
If workers are suﬃciently diﬀerent in terms of productivity and cost of ed-
ucation, the model has a unique separating equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
workers in the high-education group do not need to overinvest in educa-
tion. The presence of overconﬁdent low-ability workers in the high-education
group implies that the average product of a worker in that group is lower
than the product of a high-ability worker would be if everyone were rational.
So, for the same education level, ﬁrms must pay a lower wage to workers in
the high-education group than they would to high-ability workers if everyone
were rational. This implies that the marginal beneﬁt of education is lower
for overconﬁdent low-ability workers and unbiased high-ability workers than
it would be for high-ability workers if everyone were rational. Given that the
perceived marginal cost of education is the same, overconﬁdent low-ability
workers and unbiased high-ability workers will acquire at most the ﬁrst-best
education level of high-ability workers. Since overconﬁdent low-ability work-
ers and unbiased high-ability workers have a lower average product and have
acquired at most the education level high-ability workers would acquire if
everyone were rational, they must be paid a lower wage. Hence, when work-
ers are suﬃciently diﬀerent in terms of productivity and cost of education,
the equilibrium wage spread with biased workers is smaller than the one with
rational workers.
If workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity and cost of
education and the fraction of biased workers is not too high, the model has
a continuum of separating equilibria where workers in the high-education
group overinvest in education to distinguish themselves from those in the
low-education group. In the least cost separating equilibrium, the incentive
compatibility condition of underconﬁdent high-ability workers and unbiased
low-ability workers is binding. This can only happen if overconﬁdent low-
ability workers and unbiased high-ability workers acquire less education than
high-ability workers would if everyone were rational. The lower education
and lower average product imply that overconﬁdent low-ability workers and
unbiased high-ability workers are paid a lower wage than high-ability workers
would be if everyone were rational. Hence, the wage spread in the least cost
separating equilibrium with biased workers is smaller than that in the least
15cost separating equilibrium with rational workers.9
Corollary 1 shows that biased beliefs compress wages in the sense that
the wage spread with biased workers is smaller than the wage spread with
rational workers. When all workers are rational (κ = ν = 0) workers’ wages
are equal to their productivity, i.e., wH = y(eH,θH) and wL = y(eL,θL). In
the model with biased workers (κ,ν > 0) we have four groups of workers
with diﬀerent productivities. Unbiased high-ability workers have productiv-
ity y(eHO,θH), overconﬁdent low-ability workers y(eHO,θL), underconﬁdent
high-ability workers y(eLU,θH), and unbiased low-ability workers y(eLU,θL).
The wage spread across high and low paid workers (or equivalently, high and
low education workers) just equals the diﬀerence in average productivities
across these groups.
The wage spread with biased workers is smaller than that with ratio-
nal workers because the existence of overconﬁdent low-ability workers lowers
the average productivity of the high-education group and the existence of
underconﬁdent high-ability workers raises the average productivity of the
low-education group. This is a weak form of wage compression because it
says nothing about diﬀerences in wages across workers relative to diﬀerences
in productivity.
The existence of workers with biased beliefs compresses the wages of
unbiased workers relative to their productivity. This happens because the
wage of unbiased high-ability workers is smaller than productivity, wHO =
βy(eHO,θL)+(1−β)y(eHO,θH) < y(eHO,θH), whereas the wage of unbiased
low-ability workers is greater than productivity, wLU = (1 − α)y(eLU,θL) +
αy(eLU,θH) > y(eLU,θL). Hence, the wage spread across unbiased workers
is less than the productivity spread: wHO − wLU < y(eHO,θH) − y(eLU,θL).
The model also predicts that the wage spread across biased workers, i.e.,
the diﬀerence in productivities of overconﬁdent low-ability and underconﬁ-
dent high-ability workers, is greater than the productivity spread: wHO −
wLU > y(eHO,θL) − y(eLU,θH). This happens because the wage of overcon-
ﬁdent low-ability workers is greater than productivity, wHO > y(eHO,θL),
whereas the wage of underconﬁdent high-ability workers is smaller than pro-
ductivity, wLU < y(eLU,θH). This is one sense in which wage compression
does not hold in this model.
9In the most cost separating equilibrium the intuition is similar with the diﬀerence
that it is the incentive compatibility constraint of overconﬁdent low-ability workers and
unbiased high-ability workers that binds.
164 Gender Pay Gap
Empirical evidence shows that, on average, women are paid less than men.
This is known as the gender pay gap.10 The gender pay gap may be statis-
tically decomposed into two components: one due to gender diﬀerences in
measured characteristics, and the other due to “unexplained” and potentially
due to discrimination.
Various explanations have been oﬀered to justify the existence of a gender
pay gap. The gender pay gap may be due to diﬀerences in human capital of
men and women (see Mincer and Polachek, 1974). This is consistent with
empirical evidence which shows that, on average, men acquire more college
education than women and men have more full-time labor market experience
than women. According to Eckel and Grossman (2003) the gap might be
due to gender diﬀerences in risk aversion. Experimental studies have shown
that women are less willing than men to take risks or to enter a competitive
environment such as a tournament (see Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007).
Labor market discrimination may also aﬀect women’s wages. Becker
(1971) shows how a preference for men over women, either on the part of
employers, employees or costumers, can lead to women being paid less than
men. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1982), explain discrimination as arising due
to diﬀerences in the noise of productivity signals across gender. If output
depends upon matching a worker’s quality type with a job and women have
noisier signals than men, then their quality is more diﬃcult to ascertain and
they should be paid a lower wage.
In this section I show that gender diﬀerences in self-conﬁdence can con-
tribute to the gender pay gap. I do not pretend to capture the “full picture”
about the gender pay gap, but rather show the possibility of a link between
psychological diﬀerences between men and women and labor market out-
comes.11
10In the US, the gender pay gap is measured as the ratio of female to male median
earnings among full-time, year-round workers. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(2010), women who worked full time in wage and salary jobs had median weekly earnings
of $657 in 2009. This represented 80 percent of men’s median weekly earnings ($819).
At EU level, the gender pay gap is deﬁned as the relative diﬀerence in the average gross
hourly earnings of women and men within the economy as a whole. Eurostat (2011) found
a gender pay gap of 17.5 percent on average in the 27 EU Member States in 2009.
11Waldman (1994) provides an evolutionary explanation for gender diﬀerences in self-
conﬁdence. He considers an environment where individuals compete in wealth accumula-
tion, utility depends on wealth and disutility from eﬀort, and males can overestimate or
17Gender diﬀerences in self-conﬁdence have been extensively documented
in a variety of settings. Numerous psychology studies purport to show that
men are more (over-)conﬁdent than women (see references in Barber and
Odean, 2001). For example, testing for the perception of competence on
various tasks, Beyer (1990) ﬁnds that men tend either to be accurate or to
over-estimate their ability, whereas women tend to be either accurate or to
under-estimate their ability.
Paglin and Rufolo (1990) report that the propensity of women to choose
less mathematical college majors can account for the entire gender wage
diﬀerential among college graduates. Correll (2001) ﬁnds that males are
more likely to perceive that they are good at math than are those females
with equal math grades and test scores. She also ﬁnds that self-assessments
of task competence inﬂuence career-relevant decisions, even when controlling
for commonly accepted measures of ability. For males and females, the higher
they rate their mathematical competence, the greater the odds that they will
continue on the path leading to careers in the quantitative professions.
Bengtsson, Persson and Willenhag (2005) use the structure of the Eco-
nomics I exam at Stockholm University to look for gender diﬀerences in
self-conﬁdence. By answering an extra, optional question, the students can
aim for a higher mark. They ﬁnd that there are striking diﬀerences between
male and female students in terms of choices and outcomes. They ﬁnd a
clear gender diﬀerence in that male students are more inclined than female
students to take this opportunity. They also ﬁnd that female students are
slightly better at passing the exam, but male students are much better at
getting the highest grade.
To study the impact of gender diﬀerences in self-conﬁdence on the gen-
der pay gap I assume that labor supply is composed of males and females.
Let λ denote the proportion of high-ability workers in the male and female
populations. Thus, before any educational investments are made, men and
women are equally productive.
Among the low-ability males, proportion κm is overconﬁdent and, among
the high-ability males, proportion νm is underconﬁdent. Among the low-
ability females, proportion κf is overconﬁdent and, among the high-ability
females, proportion νf is underconﬁdent. Firms know λ, κm, νm, κf and νf.
underestimate their own abilities. He ﬁnds that if there is sexual inheritance of the traits
disutility from eﬀort and perception of ability, then males exhibiting both disutility from
eﬀort and overestimation of abilities can be an evolutionary stable strategy.
18The mean wage paid to males is equal to
wm = (1 − λ − κm + νm)w
LU
m + (λ + κm − νm)w
HO
m . (6)
and mean wage paid to females to
wf = (1 − λ − κf + νf)w
LU
f + (λ + κf − νf)w
HO
f . (7)
If all men and women have correct beliefs there is no gender pay gap since
νm = κf = κm = νf = 0 implies wm = wf.
To analyze the impact of gender diﬀerences in self-conﬁdence on the gen-
der pay gap I assume y(e,θ) = e + θ and c(e,θ) = e2/2θ. In this case edu-
cation and productive ability are independent since yeθ = 0. I also assume
some males are overconﬁdent—κm ∈ (0,1−λ]—and no male is underconﬁdent—
νm = 0. Finally, I assume some females are underconﬁdent—νf ∈ (0,λ]—and
no female is overconﬁdent—κf = 0.
Proposition 4: Let y(e,θ) = e + θ, c(e,θ) = e2/2θ, κm ∈ (0,1 − λ], νf ∈
(0,λ], and νm = κf = 0.
(i) If workers are suﬃciently diﬀerent in terms of productivity and cost of
education, i.e.,
θH
θL > 3 − 2min{αf,βm}, then w∗
f < w∗ < w∗
m;
(ii) If workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity and cost of
education, i.e.,
θH
θL < 3 − 2max{αf,βm}, and λ ≤ 2
3, then ˆ wf ≤ ˆ w < ˆ wm;
(ii) If
θH
θL < 3 − 2max{αf,βm}, λ > 2
3, and male overconﬁdent is high
relative to female underconﬁdence, i.e., κm
νf > 3λ−2
1−λ , then ˆ w < ˆ wf < ˆ wm;
(iv) If
θH
θL < 3 − 2max{αf,βm}, λ > 2
3, and male overconﬁdence is low
relative to female underconﬁdence, i.e., κm
νf < 3λ−2
1−λ , then ˆ w < ˆ wm < ˆ wf.
Part (i) of Proposition 4 characterizes the impact of gender diﬀerences
in self-conﬁdence on the gender pay gap when workers are suﬃciently dif-
ferent in terms of productivity and cost of education. It shows that if some
males are overconﬁdent and some females are underconﬁdent then males will,
on average, earn more than females. The intuition behind this result is as
follows.
Male overconﬁdence has two eﬀects on the mean wage of men. First, over-
conﬁdent low-ability men believe they have a low marginal cost of education
and so acquire a high education level. Since education increases productivity,
the higher education level of overconﬁdent low-ability men implies that ﬁrms
pay them a higher wage than the wage ﬁrms would pay to low-ability work-
ers if everyone were rational. Second, unbiased high-ability men acquire less
19education than they would if everyone were rational because ﬁrms cannot
distinguish between them and overconﬁdent low-ability men and therefore
pay them their average productivity. So, unbiased high-ability men are paid
a lower wage than would be paid to high-ability workers if everyone were
rational. The increase in the wage of overconﬁdent low-ability men is of
ﬁrst-order whereas the decrease in the wage of unbiased high-ability men is
of second-order and therefore the mean wage of males is greater than it would
be if everyone were rational.
Female underconﬁdence has two eﬀects on the mean wage of women.
First, underconﬁdent high-ability women believe they have high marginal
cost of education and so acquire a low education level. Since education in-
creases productivity, the lower education level of underconﬁdent high-ability
women implies that ﬁrms pay them a lower wage than the wage ﬁrms would
pay to high-ability workers if everyone were rational. Second, unbiased low-
ability women acquire more education than they would if everyone were ratio-
nal because ﬁrms cannot distinguish between them and underconﬁdent high-
ability women and therefore pay them their average productivity. Hence,
unbiased low-ability women are paid a higher wage than would be paid to
low-ability workers if everyone were rational. The decrease in the wage of
underconﬁdent high-ability women is of ﬁrst-order whereas the increase in
the wage of unbiased low-ability women is of second-order and therefore the
mean wage of females is lower than it would be if everyone were rational.
Parts (ii)-(iv) of Proposition 4 refer to the case when workers are suf-
ﬁciently similar in terms of productivity and cost of education.12 Part (ii)
shows that if some males are overconﬁdent, some females underconﬁdent,
and the fraction of high-ability workers is at most 2/3, then males will, on
average, earn more than females. Part (iii) shows that if λ > 2/3 and male
overconﬁdence is high compared to female underconﬁdence, then males will
earn, on average, more than females. Finally, part (iv) shows that if λ > 2/3
and male overconﬁdence is low compared to female underconﬁdence, then
females will earn, on average, more than males.
As before, male overconﬁdence raises the wage of overconﬁdent low-ability
males in relation to the wage low-ability workers would get if everyone were
12Cho and Kreps’ (1987) intuitive criterion selects the least cost separating equilibrium
as the unique prediction of Spence’s signaling model. Therefore, when workers are suf-
ﬁciently similar in terms of productivity and cost of education, I focus on the impact of
gender diﬀerences in self-conﬁdence on the least cost separating equilibrium mean wages
paid to males and to females, ˆ wm and ˆ wf, respectively.
20rational and lowers the wage of unbiased high-ability males in relation to the
wage high-ability workers would get if everyone were rational. The ﬁrst eﬀect
is of ﬁrst-order whereas the second eﬀect is of second-order and therefore the
mean wage of males is greater than it would be if everyone were rational.
Also, female overconﬁdence lowers the wage of underconﬁdent high-ability
females in relation to the wage high-ability workers would get if everyone
were rational and raises the wage of unbiased low-ability females in relation
to the wage low-ability workers would get if everyone were rational. However,
when workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity and cost of
education, female underconﬁdence has an additional eﬀect on female wages.
In the least cost separating equilibrium, unbiased low-ability females must be
indiﬀerent between acquiring their low education level and the high education
level acquired by unbiased high-ability women. Since female underconﬁdence
raises the wage of unbiased low-ability females in relation to the wage low-
ability workers would get if everyone were rational, unbiased high-ability
women must overinvest more in education than high-ability workers would if
everyone were rational. The higher (over)investment in education increases
the productivity of unbiased high-ability females and, therefore, their wage.
When the fraction of high-ability workers is at most 2/3, the mean wage
of women is at most the mean wage workers would get if everyone were ratio-
nal because the decrease in the wage of underconﬁdent high-ability females
dominates the increase in the wages of unbiased low- and high-ability females.
When λ > 2/3 and male overconﬁdence is high compared to female under-
conﬁdence, the mean wage of males raises by more than the mean wage of
females relative to the mean wage workers would get if everyone were rational.
Hence, males will, on average, earn more than females. When λ > 2/3 and
male overconﬁdence is low compared to female underconﬁdence, the mean
wage of males raises by less than the mean wage of females relative to the
mean wage workers would get if everyone were rational. Hence, females will,
on average, earn more than males.
My next result characterizes the impact of gender diﬀerences on the gen-
der pay gap when y(e,θ) = eθ and c(e,θ) = e2/2θ. In this case education
and productive ability are complements since yeθ > 0.
Proposition 5: Let y(e,θ) = eθ, c(e,θ) = e2/2θ, κm ∈ (0,1 − λ], νf ∈
(0,λ], νm = κf = 0,  f =
(θL+αfρ)2
θ2
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νf > Φ, then ˆ wm < ˆ wf < ˆ w.
Parts (i)-(iii) of Proposition 5 characterize the impact of gender diﬀer-
ences in self-conﬁdence on the gender pay gap when workers are suﬃciently
diﬀerent in terms of productivity and cost of education. Parts (iv)-(vi) refer
to the case when workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity and
cost of education.
Proposition 5 shows that the main qualitative ﬁndings in Proposition
4 also apply when education and productive ability are complements: for
most parameter conﬁgurations, gender diﬀerences in self-conﬁdence imply
that males will, on average, earn more than females.
The main qualitative diﬀerence between the two propositions is that part
(iii) of Proposition 5 shows that if workers are suﬃciently diﬀerent in terms of
productivity and cost of education, and male overconﬁdence is high relative
to female underconﬁdence, then females might earn more, on average, than
males.13
This model only explains a gender pay gap due to measured character-
istics: diﬀerences in educational investments of males and females. The as-
sumption that education raises productivity, ye > 0, is critical to this result.
If education has no direct eﬀect on productivity, ye = 0, then biased beliefs
do not lead males’ educational investments to diﬀer from those of females
and there is no gender pay gap.
Gender diﬀerentials in educational investments are well documented. In
the US women have recently surpassed men in terms of completing secondary
and post-secondary education.14 Gender diﬀerences in ﬁeld of study compo-
13To see this let φ(r) = r2−1+r
r2−1−r where r = θH
θL . The inequality κm
νf > φ(r) is only satisﬁed
when the proportion of overconﬁdent males is high relative to that of underconﬁdent
females since φ(r) > 1 for all r > 1 and φ(2) = 5.
14In 2007, the Current Population Survey (2007) estimated that 18,423,000 males ages
22sition are larger (more unequal) than those for college attainment. While
women are now more likely to complete a college degree than men, the dis-
tribution of college majors among college graduates remains unequal with
women about 2/3 as likely as men to major in science, mathematics, engineer-
ing, business or economics. In contrast, women are much more likely than
men to major in humanities, social sciences and teaching (see Gemici and
Wiswall, 2011). My model shows how gender diﬀerences in self-conﬁdence
can contribute to gender diﬀerences in educational investments across ﬁelds
of study which in turn lead to the gender pay gap.
5 Welfare Impact of Biased Beliefs
In this section I characterize the impact of biased beliefs on welfare. To do
that I compare welfare levels with biased and rational workers. In both cases
ﬁrms make zero proﬁts so welfare is equal to the weighted average of the
utilities of each group of workers.
To evaluate the utility of a biased worker I take the perspective of an
outside observer who knows the worker’s actual marginal cost of acquiring
education.15 Hence, welfare with biased workers is
W







HO,θL) + (1 − λ − κ)u(w(e
LU),e
LU,θL). (8)
When all workers are unbiased, Spence’s (1973) model shows that if the
two groups of workers are suﬃciently diﬀerent, then there is a unique sepa-
rating equilibrium where investments in education are the eﬃcient ones and
the outcome is as if there was perfect information in the market place. Thus,
the existence of workers with biased beliefs acts as a distortion which lowers
welfare when workers are suﬃciently diﬀerent.
Let us then focus on the interesting case where workers are suﬃciently
similar in terms of productivity and cost of education. One of the main results
eighteen and over held a bachelor’s degree, while 20,501,000 females ages eighteen and over
held one. Fewer males held a master’s degree, as well: 6,472,000 males had received one
and 7,283,000 females had. However, more men held professional and doctoral degrees
than women. 2,033,000 males held professional degrees and 1,079,000 females did and
1,678,000 males had received a doctoral degree, while 817,000 females had.
15This is the “hardest” test. An alternative would be to measure the utility of biased
workers according to their perceived utility function.
23of Spence’s (1973) model is that in this case private information about ability
reduces welfare. This happens because high-ability workers must overinvest
in education (by comparison with the complete information education level)
to distinguish themselves from low-ability workers.
My ﬁrst welfare result shows that if workers are suﬃciently similar in
terms of productivity and cost of education and all biased workers are over-
conﬁdent, then biased beliefs reduce welfare.
Proposition 6: If all biased workers are overconﬁdent and workers are
suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity and cost of acquiring education—
inequality (5) is satisﬁed when α = 0 and β > 0—, then ˆ W R > ˆ W B, i.e.,
welfare in the least cost separating equilibrium with rational workers is higher
than in the least cost separating equilibrium with overconﬁdent workers.
This result follows from the fact that the existence of overconﬁdent low-
ability workers and the absence of underconﬁdent high-ability workers imply
that the utility of unbiased high-ability workers is smaller than the utility of
high-ability workers would be if everyone were rational.
The existence of overconﬁdent low-ability workers has two eﬀects on the
utility of unbiased high-ability workers. On the one hand, the fact that un-
biased high-ability workers are pooled with overconﬁdent low-ability workers
implies that the wage of unbiased high-ability workers is lower than that of
high-ability in the rational model. The lower wage has a ﬁrst-order adverse
impact on the utility of unbiased high-ability workers. On the other hand,
for a ﬁxed education level, the lower wage relaxes the incentive compatibility
condition of unbiased low-ability workers. Hence, (over)investment in educa-
tion by unbiased high-ability workers will be smaller than would be that by
high-ability workers if everyone were rational. The lower (over)investment
in education has a second-order favorable impact on the utility of unbiased
high-ability workers. Hence, unbiased high-ability workers are worse oﬀ than
high-ability workers would be in the rational model.
Can biased beliefs improve welfare when workers are suﬃciently simi-
lar in terms of productivity and cost of education? It turns out that the
existence of underconﬁdent high-ability workers is a necessary (but not suf-
ﬁcient) condition for biased beliefs to improve welfare. First, the presence of
underconﬁdent high-ability workers implies that unbiased low-ability work-
ers attain a higher utility than low-ability workers would if everyone were
rational—Proposition 2 part (iii). Second, if some high-ability workers are
underconﬁdent, then unbiased high-ability workers do not need to overinvest
24in education as much as high-ability workers would if everyone were ratio-
nal. Hence, the existence of underconﬁdent low-ability workers improves the
utility of unbiased low-ability workers and might also improve the utility of
unbiased high-ability workers.
To fully characterize the impact of biased beliefs on welfare when workers
are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity and cost of education we also
need to take into account the utility of biased workers. Generally, we cannot
determine how the ex-post utilities of underconﬁdent high-ability workers
and overconﬁdent low-ability workers compare to the utilities of high- and
low-ability workers, respectively.
To answer this question I specialize the model by assuming y(e,θ) = θ
and c(e,θ) = eγ/θ, with γ > 1. In this case education has no impact on
productivity like in Spence (1973). My last result provides bounds on the
fractions of overconﬁdent low-ability and underconﬁdent high-ability workers
under which biased beliefs improve welfare in the specialized model.
Proposition 7: Let y(e,θ) = θ and c(e,θ) = eγ/θ, with γ > 1. If
κ <
(1 − λ)θL













then ˆ W B > ˆ W R.
Condition (9) provides an upper bound for the fraction of overconﬁdent
low-ability workers and condition (10) provides lower and upper bounds for
the fraction of underconﬁdent high-ability workers. When these conditions
are satisﬁed, welfare in the least cost separating equilibrium with biased
workers is higher than welfare in the least cost separating equilibrium with
rational workers.
The existence of underconﬁdent high-ability workers leads to a ﬁrst-order
increase in the wage of unbiased low-ability workers but only a second-order
increase in their cost of education. Thus, unbiased low-ability workers do
better than low-ability workers would if everyone were rational. The existence
of biased workers lowers the wage and the cost of education of unbiased high-
ability workers. If the fraction of overconﬁdent low-ability workers is not too
high and the fraction of underconﬁdent high-ability workers is moderate, the
fall in cost of education of unbiased high-ability workers is higher than the fall
25in the wage. Thus, unbiased high-ability workers do better than high-ability
workers would if everyone were rational.
6 Discussion
In this section I explain how my analysis contributes to the theoretical and
empirical literature on the role of education as a labor market signal. I also
discuss some extensions and limitations of the analysis.
In Spence’s (1973) basic signaling model education does not raise produc-
tivity, workers are perfectly informed about their abilities, all information
about a worker’s type is collected prior to the entry in the labor market, and
there are only two types of workers and one sector. This model has been
extended in several directions.
Spence (1974) considers a two-sector model with diﬀerent returns to abil-
ity in the two sectors where education may be productive. Riley (1979a)
shows how the model can be extended to the case in which worker types are
continuous.
Weiss (1983), Riley (1979b), and Hvide (2003) relax the assumption that
workers are perfectly informed about their abilities. Weiss (1983) considers a
setting where workers have superior, but imperfect, information about their
own abilities and must take a pass-fail test upon their completion of schooling.
Riley (1979b) shows that if a worker’s career lasts more than a single period
and ﬁrms learn about true ability, then the importance of the initial education
signal as a factor determining compensation should decrease. Hvide (2003)
extends Spence (1974) by assuming that workers have imperfect information
about their own ability and performance contracts are an alternative sorting
mechanism to schooling. He ﬁnds that workers with intermediate ability
acquire education, while the most able skip it.
In the previous models all information about a worker’s type is collected
prior to the entry in the labor market. Alós-Ferrer and Prat (2008) extend
Spence (1973) by assuming that workers are also able to reveal their ability
after the educational signaling stage. They ﬁnd that the outcomes of the
signaling game are aﬀected by the learning process: new equilibria emerge
and these can survive the Intuitive Criterion.
My paper extends Spence’s (1973) by assuming that some workers have
biased beliefs about their marginal cost of acquiring education and abilities
(since marginal costs of schooling and productive abilities are negatively re-
26lated). I show that biased beliefs compress wages and that gender diﬀerences
in self-conﬁdence can contribute to the gender pay gap.
Many economists have conducted empirical work aimed at exploring the
signaling role of education. It has proved diﬃcult, however, to distinguish be-
tween human capital and signaling explanations of the observed relationship
between education and earnings.16 One exception is Tyler, Murnane and
Willett (2000). Using diﬀerential state General Educational Development
(GED) passing standards as an identiﬁcation strategy, Tyler et al. (2000)
ﬁnd that the signaling value of the GED increased the 1995 earnings of young
white dropouts on the margin of passing the exams by 10 to 19 percent.
Signaling can be a signiﬁcant factor in promotion and termination de-
cisions.17 DeVaro and Waldman (forthcoming) ﬁnd empirical support for
signaling being important for understanding the diﬀerences between pro-
motion practices of workers with bachelors and masters degrees, while the
evidence concerning the importance of signaling for workers with high school
and Ph.D. diplomas is mixed. Gibbons and Katz (1991) note that with
asymmetric information, termination is a negative signal of worker quality
when the terminating ﬁrm is a viable operation. This is not true if the entire
ﬁrm is closing down. They then look at data from the Displaced Worker
Supplements to the Current Population Survey and ﬁnd strong supporting
evidence.
The literature on statistical discrimination and employer learning assumes
that worker productivity is hard to observe by ﬁrms.18 This assumption gen-
erates testable predictions for the interaction between schooling and ability
with experience in earning regressions. Farber and Gibbons (1996) ﬁnd that
unmeasured skill becomes increasingly important to wage setting over time,
as employers’ learn about ability. Altonji and Pierret (2001) ﬁnd that em-
16See Riley (2001), Lange and Topel (2006) and DeVaro and Waldman (forthcoming).
17In Waldman (1984) ﬁrms compete for labor using the job assignment of a competitor’s
employee as a signal of his ability. Because an employer does not want to signal the true
capacity of a good employee to competitors, employees might not be assigned tasks which
maximize their contribution to the ﬁrm’s proﬁts.
18There are two ways of thinking about learning in labor markets. Harris and Holmstrom
(1982), Farber and Gibbons (1996), Gibbons and Waldman (1999), and Altonji and Pierret
(2001), assume that learning is symmetric, that is, any information revealed about a
worker’s ability during a worker’s career is public knowledge. In contrast, Waldman (1984),
Greenwald (1986), and Gibbons and Katz (1991), assume that learning is asymmetric, that
is, information about a worker’s ability is revealed only to the current employer, while other
ﬁrms only observe promotion and ﬁring decisions.
27ployers initially use education as a proxy of unobserved ability, and rely on
it less as ability becomes known. Lange (2007) estimates that the speed with
which employers learn is rapid and argues that signaling can only explain a
small fraction of the private gains from schooling.
In a Spence (1973) separating equilibrium there is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between ability and education level, so there is nothing to learn after
individuals start working. This is problematic because, as we have seen, the
empirical evidence suggests that there is substantial learning after employ-
ment starts. My paper provides a potential explanation for this empirical
ﬁnding which is based on the existence of workers with mistaken beliefs.
The model could be extended by assuming that, after hiring decisions are
made and workers are paid their initial wages, ﬁrms observe workers’ output
and readjust wages before the start of an additional production period. In
this case the wages of unbiased high-ability workers and underconﬁdent high-
ability workers would rise whereas the wages of unbiased low-ability workers
and overconﬁdent low-ability workers would fall. This implies that wage
compression would fall with worker age. This prediction might not be sup-
ported by empirical evidence. For example, Frazis and Loewenstein (2006),
using data from the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project, ﬁnd that only
32 percent of diﬀerences in starting productivity (measured by subjective
ratings of employers) are reﬂected in diﬀerences in starting wages and that
productivity growth of 10 percent results in wage growth of only 2.6 percent.
Another possible extension is to relax the assumption that the utility of
a worker who stays at home is zero. For a high enough reservation utility,
workers with a high marginal cost of acquiring education might rather stay
at home than get educated. The existence of underconﬁdent high-ability
workers raises the number of workers who choose to stay at home and can
lead to signiﬁcant welfare losses.
Finally, the model could be extended to include job assignment in the
spirit of Gibbons and Waldman (1999, 2006). Suppose that each ﬁrm has
two diﬀerent jobs, 1 and 2, and that the eﬃcient assignment for a high pro-
ductivity worker is job 2, while the eﬃcient assignment for a low productivity
worker is job 1. Firms assign workers to jobs on the basis of their education
level since workers’ productivities are unobservable. In a separating equilib-
rium, high education workers would be assigned to job 2 and low education
workers to job 1. Introducing biased beliefs in this set-up would lead to wel-
fare losses due to job misassignment since ﬁrms would assign overconﬁdent
workers to job 2 and underconﬁdent workers to job 1.
287 Conclusion
This paper extends Spence’s (1973) model by assuming that a fraction of
workers in the labor market do not accurately evaluate their marginal cost
of acquiring education. More precisely, some workers are overconﬁdent and
some underconﬁdent. In addition, I assume that ﬁrms know the fractions of
high-ability, overconﬁdent and underconﬁdent workers.
I ﬁnd that the wage spread with biased workers is smaller than that with
rational workers. I also ﬁnd that biased beliefs compress the wages of unbi-
ased workers relative to their productivities. I show that gender diﬀerences
in self-assessments can contribute to the gender pay gap. If men are overcon-
ﬁdent, women underconﬁdent, and education raises productivity, then men
will, on average, earn more than women.
Finally, I show that if workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of produc-
tivity and cost of education, then biased beliefs improve welfare provided
that the fraction of overconﬁdent low-ability workers is not too high and the
fraction of underconﬁdent high-ability workers is moderate.
The model also provides a potential explanation for the empirical ﬁnding
that there is substantial learning about workers’ productivity after employ-
ment starts. At the start of the employment relationship ﬁrms cannot dis-
tinguish between overconﬁdent low-ability workers and unbiased high-ability
workers and pay both types of workers the average productivity associated
with their high educational investment. Similarly, ﬁrms cannot distinguish
between underconﬁdent high-ability workers and unbiased low-ability work-
ers and pay both types of workers the average productivity associated with
their low educational investment. As time passes, ﬁrms observe workers’ out-
put and are able to learn the true skill of each worker which, together with
their educational investments, determine their true productivity.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
(i) The education level of underconﬁdent high-ability workers and unbiased
low-ability workers, eLU, is the solution to maxe(1−α)y(e,θL)+αy(e,θH)−
c(e,θL). Thus, eLU is implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order condition: (1 −
α)ye(e,θL)+αye(e,θH)−ce(e,θL) = 0. The second-order condition is satisﬁed
since yee ≤ 0, cee > 0, and α > 0 imply (1 − α)yee(e,θL) + αyee(e,θL) −





(1 − α)yee(e,θL) + αyee(e,θL) − cee(e,θL)
≥ 0. (11)
It follows from (11) that eLU ≥ e∗(θL) = argmaxe y(e,θL) − c(e,θL).
(ii) The wage of underconﬁdent high-ability workers and unbiased low-ability
workers is w(eLU) = (1 − α)y(eLU,θL) + αy(eLU,θH). The ﬁrst-best wage of
low-ability workers is w∗(θL) = y(e∗(θL),θL). From (i) we know that eLU ≥
e∗(θL) which implies y(eLU,θL) ≥ y(e∗(θL),θL). This, together with α > 0
and the deﬁnitions of w(eLU) and w∗(θL), implies w(eLU) > w∗(θL).
(iii) The utility of education level eLU for an unbiased low-ability worker is






∂α. The ﬁrst term is zero—from the Envelope Theorem—and the
sign of the second term is positive since yθ > 0. Hence, u(w(eLU),eLU,θL) >
u∗(θL) = y(e∗(θL),θL) − c(e∗(θL),θL). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
(i) If inequality (5) is violated, the education level of overconﬁdent low-
ability workers and unbiased high-ability workers, eHO, is the solution to
maxe βy(e,θL) + (1 − β)y(e,θH) − c(e,θH). Thus, eHO is implicitly deﬁned
by the ﬁrst-order condition βye(e,θL)+(1−β)ye(e,θH)−ce(e,θH) = 0. The
second-order condition is satisﬁed since yee ≤ 0, cee > 0, and β > 0 imply
βyee(e,θL) + (1 − β)yee(e,θH) − cee(e,θH) < 0. From the implicit deﬁnition





βyee(e,θL) + (1 − β)yee(e,θH) − cee(e,θH)
≤ 0. (12)
It follows from (12) that eHO ≤ e∗(θH) = argmaxe y(e,θH) − c(e,θH).
(ii) The wage of overconﬁdent low-ability workers and unbiased high-ability
workers is w(eHO) = βy(eHO,θL) + (1 − β)y(eHO,θH). The ﬁrst-best wage
of high-ability workers is w∗(θH) = y(e∗(θH),θH). From (i) we know that
eHO ≤ e∗(θH) which implies y(eHO,θH) ≤ y(e∗(θH),θH). This, together with
β > 0 and the deﬁnitions of w(eHO) and w∗(θH), implies w(eHO) < w∗(θH).
(iii) The utility of education level eHO for an unbiased high-ability worker is






∂β. The ﬁrst term is zero—from the Envelope Theorem—and the
sign of the second term is negative since yθ > 0. Hence, u(w(eHO),eHO,θH) <
u∗(θH) = y(e∗(θH),θH) − c(e∗(θH),θH). Q.E.D.
30Proof of Proposition 3:
(i) In the least cost separating equilibrium with biased workers inequality (3)
is binding. Denote the lowest eHO that satisﬁes inequality (3) by ˆ eHO. In a







In the least cost separating equilibrium with rational workers inequality (13)
is binding. Denote the lowest eH that satisﬁes inequality (13) by ˆ eH. Can









H,θH) − c(ˆ e
H,θH) − [c(ˆ e
H,θL) − c(ˆ e










HO,θL) − c(ˆ e
HO,θH)],
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Proposition 1 part (iii), the equality
follows from the deﬁnition of ˆ eH, and the last inequality follows from: (1)
ˆ eHO ≥ ˆ eH > e∗(θH) implies y(ˆ eH,θH)−c(ˆ eH,θH) ≥ y(ˆ eHO,θH)−c(ˆ eHO,θH),
(2) yθ(e,θ) > 0 implies y(ˆ eHO,θH) > y(ˆ eHO,θL), and (3) ˆ eHO ≥ ˆ eH, cθ(e,θ) <
0, and ceθ(e,θ) < 0 imply c(ˆ eHO,θL) − c(ˆ eHO,θH) ≥ c(ˆ eH,θL) − c(ˆ eH,θH).
Hence, it must be that ˆ eHO < ˆ eH.
In the most cost separating equilibrium with biased workers inequality (4) is
binding. Denote the highest eHO that satisﬁes inequality (4) by   eHO. In a







In the most cost separating equilibrium with rational workers inequality (14)
is binding. Denote the highest eH that satisﬁes inequality (14) by   eH. Can it




















∗(θL),θH)] = y(  e
H,θH) − c(  e
H,θH)
> y(  e








31where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Proposition 1 part (iii) and c(eLU,θL)−
c(eLU,θH) ≥ c(e∗(θL),θL) − c(e∗(θL),θH), the equality follows from the def-
inition of   eH, and the last inequality follows from: (1)   eHO ≥   eH > e∗(θH)
implies y(  eH,θH)−c(  eH,θH) ≥ y(  eHO,θH)−c(  eHO,θH), and (2) yθ(e,θ) > 0
implies y(  eHO,θH) > y(  eHO,θL). Hence, it must be that   eHO <   eH.
(ii) If ˆ eHO < ˆ eH, then w(ˆ eHO) = βy(ˆ eHO,θL)+(1 − β)y(ˆ eHO,θH) < y(ˆ eH,θH)
= w(ˆ eH). If   eHO <   eH, then w(  eHO) = βy(  eHO,θL) + (1 − β)y(  eHO,θH) <
y(  eH,θH) = w(  eH). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
When y(e,θ) = e + θ, the ﬁrms’ strategy for females is
wf(e) =
￿
(θL + αfρ) + e, for e < eHO
f
θH + e, for e ≥ eHO
f
,
and that for males is
wm(e) =
￿
θL + e, for e < eHO
m
(θH − βmρ) + e, for e ≥ eHO
m
,
where αf = νf/(1 − λ + νf), βm = κm/(λ + κm), and ρ = θH − θL.
(i) When
θH
θL > 3−2βm there is a unique separating equilibrium for the male
population. Unbiased low-ability males acquire education eLU
m = θL and
receive wage wLU
m = 2θL. Overconﬁdent low-ability males and unbiased high-
ability males acquire education eHO
m = θH and receive wage wHO
m = 2θH−βmρ.
Hence, from (6), the mean wage paid to males is equal to
w
∗
m = (1 − λ − κm)2θL + (λ + κm)(2θH − βmρ)










∗ + κmρ, (15)




θL > 3 − 2α there is a unique separating equilibrium for the female
population. Underconﬁdent high-ability females and unbiased low-ability
females acquire education eLU
f = θL and receive wage wLU
f = 2θL + αfρ.
Unbiased high-ability females acquire education eHO
f = θH and receive wage
32wHO
f = 2θH. Hence, from (7), the mean wage paid to females is equal to
w
∗
f = (1 − λ + νf)(2θL + αfρ) + (λ − νf)2θH
= 2(1 − λ)θL + 2λθH − νf(2 − αf)ρ + (1 − λ)αfρ
= w
∗ − νf
2(1 − λ) + νf
1 − λ + νf
ρ + (1 − λ)
νf
1 − λ + νf
ρ
= w





θL > 3 − 2min{αf,βm}, we have w∗
m − w∗
f = (κm + νf)ρ > 0, and
wf




θL < 3 − 2βm there is a continuum of separating equilibria
for the male population. In the least cost separating equilibrium, unbiased
low-ability males acquire education eLU
m = θL and receive wage wLU
m = 2θL.
The incentive compatibility condition of unbiased low-ability males is binding
and so the education level of overconﬁdent low-ability males and unbiased









Solving (17) for e we obtain
ˆ e
HO
m = θL +
￿
2θL(1 − βm)ρ.




m = (θH − βmρ) + θL +
￿
2θL(1 − βm)ρ.
Hence, from (6), the mean wage paid to males is equal to
ˆ wm = (1−λ−κm)2θL+(λ+κm)
￿





Setting κm = βm = 0 in (18) we obtain the least cost separating wage when
everyone is rational
ˆ w = (1 − λ)2θL + λ
￿





33Using (19) we can rewrite (18) as
ˆ wm = ˆ w + κm
￿















A ﬁrst-order Taylor series expansion of ˆ wm around κm = 0 gives us
ˆ wm ≈ ˆ wm|κm=0 +
∂ ˆ wm
∂κm
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
κm=0





and so ˆ wm > ˆ w.
When
θH
θL < 3−2αf there is a continuumof separating equilibria for the female
population. In the least cost separating equilibrium, underconﬁdent high-
ability females and unbiased low-ability females acquire education eLU
f = θL
and receive wage wLU
f = 2θL + αfρ. The incentive compatibility condition
of underconﬁdent high-ability females and unbiased low-ability females is
binding and so the education level of unbiased high-ability females is given
by








Solving (21) for e we obtain
ˆ e
HO
f = θL +
￿
2θL(1 + αf)ρ.
So, unbiased high-ability females receive wage
ˆ w
HO
f = θH + θL +
￿
2θL(1 + αf)ρ.
Hence, from (7), the mean wage paid to females is equal to
ˆ wf = (1−λ+νf)(2θL+αfρ)+(λ−νf)
￿





Using (19) we can rewrite (22) as
ˆ wf = ˆ w − νf
￿








1 + αf − 1
￿
.
34A ﬁrst-order Taylor series expansion of ˆ wf around νf = 0 gives us
ˆ wf ≈ ˆ wf|νf=0 +
∂ ˆ wf
∂νf
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
νf=0





The expansion shows that if λ ≤ 2/3, then ˆ wf ≤ ˆ w. However, if λ > 2/3,
then ˆ wf > ˆ w.
When
θH
θL < 3−2max{αf,βm}, the ﬁrst-order Taylor series expansions (20)
and (23) imply that












From (20), (23), and (24) we see that λ ≤ 2/3 implies ˆ wf ≤ ˆ w < ˆ wm, which
proves (ii). We also see that λ > 2/3 and κm
νf > 3λ−2
1−λ imply ˆ w < ˆ wf < ˆ wm,
which proves (iii). Finally, we see that λ > 2/3 and κm
νf < 3λ−2
1−λ imply
ˆ w < ˆ wm < ˆ wf, which proves (iv). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5:
When y(e,θ) = eθ, the ﬁrms’ strategy for females is
wf(e) =
￿
(θL + αfρ)e, for e < eHO
f
θHe, for e ≥ eHO
f
,
and that for males is
wm(e) =
￿
θLe, for e < eHO
m





θL > 2 −
θ3
L
θH(θH−βmρ)2 there is a unique separating equilibrium
for the male population. Unbiased low-ability males acquire education eLU
m =
θ2
L and receive wage wLU
m = θ3
L. Overconﬁdent low-ability males and unbiased
high-ability males acquire education eHO
m = (θH − βmρ)θH and receive wage
wHO




m = (1 − λ − κm)θ
3
L + (λ + κm)(θH − βmρ)
2θH.
A ﬁrst-order Taylor series expansion of w∗
m around κm = 0 (it is not necessary
to use a second-order expansion since the second order term in the expansion
















L − θLθH)κm. (25)
35The expansion shows that if θ2
H − θ2





2 , then w∗













there is a unique separating equilibrium for the
female population. Underconﬁdent high-ability females and unbiased low-
ability females acquire education eLU
f = (θL+αfρ)θL and receive wage wLU
f =
(θL + αfρ)2θL. Unbiased high-ability females acquire education eHO
f = θ2
H
and receive wage wHO
f = θ3




f = (1 − λ + νf)(θL + αfρ)
2θL + (λ − νf)θ
3
H.
A ﬁrst-order Taylor series expansion of w∗


















L + θLθH)νf, (26)
and so wf∗ < w∗.
When
θH











, the ﬁrst-order Taylor series













L + θLθH)νf. (27)






f < w∗ ≤ w∗
m,






νf < φ imply
w∗
f < w∗









f < w∗, which proves (iii).
(iv)-(vi) When
θH
θL < 2 −
θ3
L
θH(θH−βmρ)2 there is a continuum of separating
equilibria for the male population. In the least cost separating equilibrium,
unbiased low-ability males acquire education eLU
m = θ2
L and receive wage
wLU
m = θ3
L. The incentive compatibility condition of unbiased low-ability
males is binding and so the education level of overconﬁdent low-ability males
















θH − βmρ +
￿








m = (θH − βmρ)θL
￿
θH − βmρ +
￿




Hence, from (6), the mean wage paid to males is equal to




θH − βmρ +
￿




A ﬁrst-order Taylor series expansion of ˆ wm around κm = 0 gives us
ˆ wm ≈ ˆ wm|κm=0 +
∂ ˆ wm
∂κm
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
κm=0























ˆ w < ˆ wm.
When
θH
θL < 2 −
θL(θL+αfρ)2
θ3
H there is a continuum of separating equilibria for
the female population. In the least cost separating equilibrium, underconﬁ-
dent high-ability females and unbiased low-ability females acquire education
eLU
f = (θL + αfρ)θL and receive wage wLU
f = (θL + αfρ)2θL. The incentive
compatibility condition of underconﬁdent high-ability females and unbiased
low-ability females is binding and so the education level of unbiased high-


















H − (θL + αfρ)2
￿
.








H − (θL + αfρ)2
￿
,
Hence, from (7), the mean wage paid to females is equal to
ˆ wf = (1 − λ +νf)(θL +αfρ)





H − (θL + αfρ)2
￿
.
37A ﬁrst-order Taylor series expansion of ˆ wf around νf = 0 gives us
ˆ wf ≈ ˆ wf|νf=0+
∂ ˆ wf
∂νf
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
νf=0












and so ˆ wf < ˆ w.
When
θH











, the ﬁrst-order Taylor series
expansions (29) and (31) imply that

































νf < Φ we have ˆ wf < ˆ wm < ˆ w, which





νf > Φ we have ˆ wm < ˆ wf < ˆ w,
which proves (vi) Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6:
We have
ˆ W





















If ν = α = 0, then u(w(eLU),eLU,θL) = u∗(θL). Hence, (33) reduces
to ˆ W B − ˆ W R = λ
￿
u(w(ˆ eHO),ˆ eHO,θH) − u(w(ˆ eH),ˆ eH,θH)
￿
. In the least
cost separating equilibrium with overconﬁdent workers, the incentive com-
patibility condition of unbiased low-ability workers is binding: u∗(θL) =
βy(ˆ eHO,θL) + (1 − β)y(ˆ eHO,θH) − c(ˆ eHO,θL). In the least cost separating
equilibrium with rational workers, the incentive compatibility condition of
low-ability workers is binding: u∗(θL) = y(ˆ eH,θH) − c(ˆ eH,θL). Hence, we
have βy(ˆ eHO,θL) + (1 − β)y(ˆ eHO,θH) − c(ˆ eHO,θL) = y(ˆ eH,θH) − c(ˆ eH,θL).
This is equivalent to
u(w(ˆ e
HO),ˆ e















38The assumption ceθ < 0 and ˆ eH > ˆ eHO implies c(ˆ eHO,θL) − c(ˆ eHO,θH) <
c(ˆ eH,θL) − c(ˆ eH,θH). Thus, u(w(ˆ eHO), ˆ eHO,θH) < u(w(ˆ eH), ˆ eH,θH) which
implies ˆ WB < ˆ W R Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7:
When y(e,θ) = θ, the ﬁrms’ strategy is
w(e) =
￿
θL + αρ, for e < eHO
θH − βρ, for e ≥ eHO .
Underconﬁdent high-ability workers and unbiased low-ability workers choose
zero education since education is not productive. So, eLU = e∗(θL) = 0.
Underconﬁdent high-ability workers and unbiased low-ability workers do not
envy overconﬁdent low-ability workers and unbiased high-ability workers, i.e.,
θL + αρ ≥ θH − βρ − (eHO)γ/θL. The education level of overconﬁdent low-
ability workers and unbiased high-ability workers in the least cost separating
equilibrium, ˆ eHO, satisﬁes their incentive compatibility condition as an equal-
ity. Thus, ˆ eHO = [ρθL[1 − (α + β)]]
1
γ . Welfare in the least cost separating
equilibrium with biased workers is
ˆ W













+ (1 − λ + ν)(θL + αρ). (34)
Welfare in the least cost separating equilibrium with rational workers (i.e.,









+ (1 − λ)θL. (35)
It follows from (34), (35) that welfare with biased workers is higher than
welfare with rational workers if α > [ν + (α + β)(λ − ν)]
ρ
θH. Substituting α
and β and simplifying terms we obtain
ν >
￿
λ(1 − κ) −
(λ − ν)2





Since λ = argminv∈[0,λ]
(λ−ν)2
λ+κ−ν we have that ν > λ(1 − κ)
ρ
θH implies (36). A
necessary condition for a separating equilibrium to exist is that the wage of
underconﬁdent high-ability workers and unbiased low-ability workers is less
39than the wage of overconﬁdent low-ability workers and unbiased high-ability








For (36) and (37) to provide a lower and an upper bound for ν, respectively,











Solving this inequality with respect to κ we obtain (9). Thus, (9) and (10)
imply ˆ W R < ˆ W B. Q.E.D.
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